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RECOGNIZING SOVEREIGNTY IN ALASKA
NATIVE VILLAGES AFTER THE
PASSAGE OF ANCSA
Patricia Thompson
Abstract: The federal law principles of tribal sovereignty and Indian country define the
parameters of tribal self-governance. In Alaska, however, federal and state courts remain
divided on the issues of Alaska Native Village sovereignty and Indian country. This Com-
ment examines the state and federal court treatment of these issues, and concludes that
Native Villages are sovereign tribes and the lands set aside under the Alaska Native
Claims Settlement Act should define the boundaries of Indian country in Alaska.
Unlike most recognized Native American tribes,1 the sovereign sta-
tus of Alaska Native Villages is uncertain. Most recognized tribes
occupy reservations or allotments and have well-defined sovereign sta-
tus and territorial boundaries.2 Alaska Native Villages, however,
occupy land set aside under the Alaska Native Claims Settlement Act
(ANCSA),3 which settled aboriginal land claims in Alaska, but failed
to resolve questions of Native Village sovereignty or territorial juris-
diction. Federal and Alaska state courts have reached conflicting res-
olutions of these issues, even though both court systems have applied
the same federal law. The Alaska courts have consistently denied that
Native Villages are sovereign. Federal courts, on the other hand, have
concluded that Native Villages are tribes possessing certain aspects of
sovereignty. This conflict between the state and federal courts leaves
Native Villages uncertain about the extent of their sovereign powers
and territorial control. For Native Villages, the desire for self-gov-
erning powers is not merely a nostalgic battle, a reminiscence of a tra-
dition lost. The present-day needs of Alaska Native Villages as socio-
political entities require self-government and territorial control.
This Comment examines the sovereign status and territorial control
of Alaska Native Villages after the passage of ANCSA. Part I pro-
vides a historical background of the legislation and judicial decisions
surrounding the state-federal conflict over Native Village sovereignty
and Indian country.4 Part II argues that under federal law Native
1. In this Comment, "Native American tribes" refers to tribes outside the State of Alaska,
and "Indians" refers to both Native American tribes and Alaska Natives.
2. See FELIX S. COHEN'S HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW 28 (Rennard Strickland et
a]. eds., 1982) [hereinafter COHEN].
3. 43 U.S.C.A. §§ 1601-1629(a) (West 1986 & Supp. 1991).
4. Indian country is the territory over which recognized tribes exercise governmental
authority. COHEN, supra note 2, at 27.
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Villages are sovereign tribes occupying Indian country. Part III exam-
ines Indian country in Alaska after ANCSA, and suggests that the
territorial limits established under ANCSA should define the bounda-
ries of Indian country in Alaska.
I. FEDERAL INDIAN LAW AND THE TREATMENT OF
ALASKA NATIVES
Although the federal government was experienced in matters con-
cerning the legal status of Native American tribes generally, it largely
ignored the issue of Alaska Natives' legal status. In fact, until the
Gold Rush began in 1896, the federal government paid little attention
to the needs of all Alaskans, both Native and non-Native.5 This fail-
ure to address the legal status of Alaska Natives led to a confused
application of federal Indian law to Alaska Native issues. Under fed-
eral Indian law, recognized tribes possess limited sovereignty which
affords them certain governmental powers. Recognized tribes also
stand in a special fiduciary relationship to the federal government,
which entitles them to certain benefits and protections. To ensure that
only sovereign tribes benefit from this relationship, both federal and
state courts traditionally use a "Tribe-Indian country test" to deter-
mine sovereign status. Despite the existence of a single governing law,
Alaska Native Villages have received varying treatment by Congress,
the Alaska state courts, and the federal courts.
A. Determining Tribal Sovereignty
The principle of tribal sovereignty recognizes Indian tribes as dis-
tinct political communities, exercising powers cf self-government
within territorial boundaries.6 While tribes are sovereign entities
existing within the United States, they are dependent sovereigns and
their relationship to the federal government is that of a ward to a
guardian.7 This special fiduciary relationship confers on tribes certain
benefits and protections. In order to determine who is entitled to ben-
efit from this fiduciary relationship, the courts have developed the two-
pronged Tribe-Indian country test to determine whether an Indian
group is a sovereign tribe.'
5. CLAUS-M. NASKE, A HISTORY OF ALASKA STATEHOOD 69-71 (1985).
6. See COHEN, supra note 2, at 232.
7. Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1, 17 (1831).
8. See generally Paul A. Matteoni, Comment, Alaskan Native Indian Villages: The Question
of Sovereign Rights, 28 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 875 (1988).
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L Federal Indian Law Principle of Tribal Sovereignty
Tribal sovereignty derives from the political existence of tribes
before the United States existed, and their right of self-governance
flows from this pre-existing sovereignty.' Thus, tribal sovereignty is
an inherent power, not a power granted by the federal government.10
Yet, because an independent sovereign cannot exist within the United
States, courts have held that the inclusion of tribes within the United
States limited, but did not abolish, tribal sovereignty.11 Tribes, there-
fore, retain all sovereign powers that Congress has not explicitly extin-
guished or limited and which are not inconsistent with their dependent
status.12 Sovereign tribes may decide issues of tribal government and
membership, legislate civil and criminal laws, levy taxes, and control
social institutions such as marriage and adoption."3
The recognition of tribes as dependent sovereigns within the United
States marked the ascendancy of federal power over Native tribes.14
This subordination of Native sovereignty to federal power, and the
resulting forced reliance on the federal government, gave rise to a
unique fiduciary relationship between Native tribes and the United
States.15 Thus, Congress and federal officials must deal fairly with and
protect the interests and rights of Indian tribes in their administration
of Indian affairs.16 This fiduciary relationship also creates a presump-
tion in favor of preserving Indian rights. 17
In order to ensure that the federal government fulfills its fiduciary
responsibilities, federal courts have developed canons of construction
for resolving issues concerning Indians. Utilizing a presumption of
benevolent congressional intent, courts will construe treaties, statutes,
agreements, and orders in favor of establishing or protecting Indian
rights.18 Courts also require that congressional action toward tribes
must be tied rationally to the federal government's fiduciary responsi-
9. See COHEN, supra note 2, at 231.
10. Id.
11. Id.; United States v. Wheeler, 435 U.S. 313, 322-23 (1978).
12. Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe, 435 U.S. 191, 210 (1978).
13. See Montana v. United States, 450 U.S. 544, 563-67 (1981). But cf Brendale v.
Confederated Tribes and Bands of Yakima Indian Nation, 492 U.S. 408 (1989) (distinguishing
between power to zone on open and closed areas of reservation).
14. DAVID S. CASE, ALASKA NATIVES AND AMERICAN LAWS 4 (1984).
15. See id. at 4-5.
16. Id.
17. See COHEN, supra note 2, at 220-28.
18. Id. Abrogation or limitation of Indian rights requires a "clear and plain" statement of
congressional intent. See id. at 221-23.
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bility.19 Thus, the tradition of tribal sovereignty serves as a backdrop
against which courts will strictly review all federal Indian laws.20
2. The Tribe-Indian Country Test
An Indian group must satisfy the two-pronged Tribe-Indian coun-
try test before the courts will recognize its sovereignty. 21 Under this
test, the group must be a tribe in the political sense and must inhabit
an area defined as Indian country.22 This test emures that only a
political entity benefits from the federal-tribal relationship.23
Under federal law, an Indian group can satisfy the first prong of this
Tribe-Indian country test in several ways. First, an Indian community
constitutes a tribe if the federal government recognizes it as a tribe.24
Second, under Montoya v. United States25 an Indian group is a tribe if
its members are of the same or similar race, live in a community, have
one leadership or government, and inhabit a particular territory.26
Under either of the above, the community must also demonstrate that
it is the modem day successor of a historical sovereign entity.2 7 Third,
the community may also establish its tribal status by reference to the
nature and scope of its relationship with the federal government.28
Under this third means of proving tribal status, the federal courts will
generally recognize tribal existence unless the tribe has voluntarily
assimilated into non-Indian culture.29
An Indian group satisfies the second prong of the Tribe-Indian
country test by demonstrating that it occupies Indian country. Fed-
eral Indian law defines Indian country as including reservations, allot-
ments held by Indians, and "dependent Indian communities.
30
Legislation or title documents generally define reservations and allot-
19. Morton v. Mancari, 417 U.S. 535, 555 (1974); see also COHEN, supra note 2, at 221.
20. McClanahan v. Arizona State Tax Comm'n, 411 U.S. 164, 172-73 (1973); see also Bryan
v. Itasca County, 426 U.S. 373 (1976).
21. Matteoni, supra note 8, at 877 n.10.
22. Id.
23. Id. at 878-80.
24. Native Village of Tyonek v. Puckett, 957 F.2d 631, 635 (9th Cir. 1992) (following United
States v. Sandoval, 231 U.S. 28, 46-47 (1913)).
25. 180 U.S. 261 (1901).
26. Id. at 266.
27. Tyonek, 957 F.2d at 635.
28. Native Village of Noatak v. Hoffman, 896 F.2d 1157, 1160 (9th Cir. 1990), rev'don other
grounds sub nom. Blatchford v. Native Village of Noatak, 111 S. Ct. 2578 (1991); Alaska v.
Native Village of Venetie, 856 F.2d 1384, 1387 (9th Cir. 1988).
29. Native Village of Venetie I.R.A. Council v. Alaska, 944 F.2d 548, 557 (9th Cir. 1991).
30. 18 U.S.C.A. § 1151 (West 1984); see United States v. Sandoval, 231 U.S. 28, 40-41 (1913)
(originating concept of dependent Indian communities).
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ments.31 However, continued occupation by an Indian tribe32 and the
relationship between the tribe and the federal government 33 define
dependent Indian communities.
An Indian group must satisfy three criteria to be a dependent Indian
community. It must meet the tribe prong of the Tribe-Indian country
test, occupy land validly set aside for it, and remain under the govern-
ment's supervision. 34 Land set aside essentially refers to territory that
did not originate in a federal grant or reservation, but where Indians
are the primary occupants. 35 An Indian group satisfies the set aside
requirement even if it occupies land that it holds in fee simple.36
Notably, the boundaries of dependent Indian communities may be
inexact because occupation, rather than title, defines their bounda-
ries . 37 Finally, a dependent Indian community is under the govern-
ment's supervision, or its power and control, when the government has
authority to enact regulations and protective laws respecting the terri-
tory.38 Such authority may be established when the government
passes protective legislation,39 or provides federal services and funds
such as educational and housing grants.40 This involvement recog-
nizes the community's continuing dependence upon federal help and
oversight.41
B. Alaska Native Villages and Tribal Sovereignty
Congress, the Alaska state courts, and the federal courts have
reached disparate conclusions regarding Native Village sovereignty.
Congressional treatment of the issues has ranged from nonexistent to
indeterminate. Federal and state courts, while applying the same fed-
eral law, remain divided on the issues of Native Village sovereignty
and Indian country.
31. See COHEN, supra note 2, at 36-42.
32. Sandoval, 231 U.S. at 40-41.
33. See Alaska v. Native Village of Venetie, 856 F.2d 1384, 1391 (9th Cir. 1988).
34. See Oklahoma Tax Comm'n v. Citizen Band Potawatomi Indian Tribe, I I1 S. Ct. 905,
910 (1991) (following United States v. John, 437 U.S. 634 (1978)).
35. See COHEN, supra note 2, at 38-39.
36. United States v. Chavez, 290 U.S. 357 (1933).
37. See COHEN, supra note 2, at 38-39.
38. See United States v. McGowan, 302 U.S. 535, 539 (1938).
39. See, eg., Alaska National Interest Lands Conservation Act, 16 U.S.C.A. § 3111(4) (West
1985); Indian Child Welfare Act, 25 U.S.C.A. § 1901(2)-(3) (West 1983).
40. Native Village of Tyonek v. Puckett, 953 F.2d 1179, 1183-84 (9th Cir.), withdrawn, 957
F.2d 631 (9th Cir. 1992).
41. Id.
377
Washington Law Review
L Congressional Treatment of Native Villages
Until 1936, the federal government paid little attention to the legal
status of Alaska Natives.42  The 1867 Treaty of Cession,41 which
transferred the Alaska Territory from Russia to the "United States, did
little more than recognize the existence of Alaska Natives. The
Alaska Organic Act of 1884" equated Native possession of land with
non-Native possession, but limited Native possession to the land they
actually occupied.45 This effectively reduced land ownership among
Alaska Natives because it did not recognize the expansive aboriginal
land area over which they traditionally ranged." The federal govern-
ment did create a small number of executive orde:r reservations for
Alaska Natives.47 Yet, none of these reservations were connected to
any federal policy aimed at addressing Alaska Native land claims, and
none of them carried permanent or compensable interest in the land.48
In 1936, Congress extended the Indian Reorganization Act4 9 (IRA)
to Alaska, thereby equating the status of Alaska Natives with Native
American Indians. ° The IRA encouraged self-governance and self-
sufficiency by permitting tribes to organize tribal governments and tri-
bal corporations for tribal business."1 The Act ended the assimilation-
ist policy of the General Allotment Act52 which alloted parcels of
reservation land to Indians and passed the "surplus" to non-Indians.53
This policy had effectively divested Natives of their lands.54 The IRA
authorized the creation of reservations for Alaska Natives on lands
already reserved for them or which they actually cccupied.55 Thus,
from 1936 until the passage of ANCSA in 1971, Congress treated
42. See generally COHEN, supra note 2, at 739.
43. Treaty of March 30, 1867, 15 Stat. 539.
44. Alaska Organic Act, ch. 53, 23 Stat. 24 (1884).
45. See COHEN, supra note 2, at 741-42.
46. Id.
47. 48 U.S.C.A. § 258 (West 1970) (originally enacted as Act of March 30, 1891, 25 Stat.
1101). Executive order reservations were reservations of land made bly executive order rather
than with the approval of Congress. See COHEN, supra note 2, at 127-28.
48. CASE, supra note 14, at 84-86.
49. 25 U.S.C.A. §§ 461-497 (West 1936). Congress expanded the 1934 IRA definition of
"tribe" to include Native Village organization: a tribe is comprised of individuals sharing a
"common bond of occupation, or association, or residence within a well-defined neighborhood,
community, or rural district ...... Id. § 473a (amending 1934 IRA).
50. CASE, supra note 14, at 7.
51. 25 U.S.C.A §§ 476, 477 (West 1983).
52. General Allotment Act, ch. 119, 24 Stat. 388 (codified as amended at 25 U.S.C.A.
§§ 331-496) (West 1983) (repealed Oct. 21, 1976).
53. Id.; see also CASE, supra note 14, at 100 (rationale behind IRA).
54. See COHEN, supra note 2, at 613-14.
55. See CASE, supra note 14, at 100.
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Alaska Natives largely the same as Native Americans generally, and
included them in all federal actions relating to Indian affairs.
In 1959, Alaska became a state, engendering conflicting claims to
the land between the new state and Native Villages. The federal gov-
ernment authorized the new state to choose 102.5 million acres from
the public domain. 6 Although the state disclaimed any right to
Native lands, the land it selected from the public domain directly con-
flicted with Native claims. 7 Reacting to Native protests against the
state's early land selections, the Secretary of the Interior froze the
state's selection process pending resolution of the Native land
claims.5 8 The discovery of oil in Alaska in the 1960s placed additional
pressure on the federal government to resolve the conflict over who
owned the land.59
In 1971, Congress passed the Alaska Native Claims Settlement
Act' (ANCSA) to provide a fair and just settlement of all aboriginal
land claims. ANCSA extinguished all reservations created prior to
1971, except the Annette Islands Reserve for the Metlakatla Indian
Community.61 Instead of reservations, the Act distributed land to
Alaska Natives through a complex organization of regional and village
corporations. 62 The Act created twelve regional corporations and
approximately two hundred village corporations based on the geo-
graphical and cultural organization of Natives, who became share-
holders.63 Native corporations hold lands under ANCSA in fee simple
with few restrictions on their sale or alienation."
Incorporated under Alaska law, the village corporations are vehicles
for holding lands distributed under the Act and for administering fed-
eral programs and benefits.65 Yet, the village corporations are not cul-
tural or governmental units.66 ANCSA corporations exist alongside
56. Alaska Statehood Act, Pub. L. No. 85-508, § 6(b), 72 Stat. 339, 340 (1958).
57. COHEN, supra note 2, at 742.
58. Public Land Order 4582, 34 Fed. Reg. 1025 (1969).
59. See generally COHEN, supra note 2, at 742.
60. 43 U.S.C.A. §§ 1601-1629(a) (West 1986 & Supp. 1991).
61. Id. § 1618(a).
62. Id. §§ 1606, 1607.
63. Id. Regional corporations selected land, and then reallocated surface estates to the village
corporations. Id. §§ 1611(b), 1613(h). Village corporations received land primarily in the
vicinity of their Villages. Id. §§ 1610(a)(1), 1611(a)-(b). Village corporations must convey to
municipal governments the title to the land in improved townships, though this area is limited.
Id. § 1613(c)(3).
64. COHEN, supra note 2, at 747. For example, Native shareholders must consent to
alienation of stock to non-Natives, who may hold only non-voting stock. 43 U.S.C.A.
§ 1606(h)(1) (West 1986 & Supp. 1991) (amended 1987).
65. COHEN, supra note 2, at 753.
66. Id.
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traditional Native governments, IRA governments and corporations,
and sometimes alongside state-created municipalities.67
2. Alaska Courts and Native Village Sovereignty
The Alaska state courts, contrary to the federal courts, have consis-
tently refused to recognize the sovereignty of Native Villages. Early
Alaska cases, decided in local federal district courts before separate
courts were created for Alaska, established a precedent denying the
existence of Indian country in Alaska.68 Later, Alaska state courts
concluded that Native Villages were not tribes. Thus, Native Villages
could not meet the two-pronged test for tribal sovereignty in the
Alaska state courts.
Early Alaska cases denied Native Villages sovereignty by conclud-
ing that there was no Indian country in Alaska. In United States v.
Seveloff,69 the court concluded that Alaska containel no Indian coun-
try because generally applicable federal Indian laws did not apply in
Alaska.7" The Seveloff court held that because Alaska was a customs
district, only laws regulating customs, commerce, and navigation
applied.71 Thus, the Indian Trade and Intercourse Act,72 which regu-
lated trade with Indians in Indian country, did not apply in Alaska. 3
The court concluded that Congress must have decided there was no
Indian country in Alaska to be regulated because it had not extended
the Act to Alaska. 4 The court therefore ruled that Alaska contained
no Indian country.75
In Kie v. United States,7 6 the federal district court strengthened the
Seveloff court's conclusion by holding that the Treaty of Cession extin-
67. Id. at 752.
68. While these early cases were in federal court, only the Alaska co arts have followed them,
and therefore they will be considered along with the state cases.
69. 27 F. Cas. 1021 (D. Or. 1872) (No. 16,252); see Sidney L. Harring, The Incorporation of
Alaska Natives Under American Law: United States and Tlingit Sovereignty, 1867-1900, 31 ARIz.
L. REV. 279, 285 (citing Sevelof). Alaska did not have federal courts until the Alaska Organic
Act, ch. 53, 23 Stat. 24 (1884), created them.
70. Harring, supra note 69, at 285 (citing Seveloff, 27 F. Cas. at 1024-25).
71. Id. As a customs district, Alaska was considered incapable of exercising self-government,
while a territory was thought capable of exercising limited home rule. NAsKE, supra note 5, at 8.
72. Indian Trade and Intercourse Act, ch. 161, 4 Stat. 729 (1934).
73. Harring, supra note 69, at 285 (Seveloffcourt relied on United States v. Tom, 1 Or. 27
(1853) (holding that Indian Trade and Intercourse Act was a local law extending to areas
existing at its enactment or where specifically extended)).
74. Id. at 285-86.
75. Id.
76. 27 F. 351 (C.C.D. Or. 1886) (hearing appeal from Alaska trial court); see Harring, supra
note 69, at 290 (citing Kie).
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guished Indian title to the land."' The Kie court convicted a Tlingit7"
man of murdering his wife, even though under Tlingit law the husband
had the right to kill his wife for adultery.79 Indians possess exclusive
jurisdiction over crimes occurring in Indian country as an attribute of
their inherent sovereignty, and Indian country includes all land with
unextinguished Indian title.8 0 Thus, if the Tlingit were sovereign,
Tlingit law would apply to the murder. However, the Kie court con-
cluded that the purchase of Alaska from Russia had extinguished any
Native title to the land.8 ' Since Native title was extinguished, Indian
country did not exist, and thus the Tlingit were not sovereign. 2
The Alaska state courts, following the tradition of Seveloff and Kie,
also found that Alaska lacked Indian country. First, the Alaska
Supreme Court held that a reservation was a prerequisite to finding
Indian country and self-government.8 3 As Alaska Native Villages
generally lacked reservations, the courts concluded there was no
Indian country in Alaska and therefore Native Villages were not sov-
ereign. 4 Second, the Alaska courts concluded that Alaska lacked
Indian country because the same civil and criminal laws applied to
both Natives and non-Natives, while federal law governed Native
Americans residing in Indian country. 5 Neither the extension of the
IRA nor any other subsequent federal legislation, including ANCSA,
had altered this situation or recognized the sovereign authority of
Native Villages.86
The Alaska state courts also denied Native Villages sovereignty by
concluding that Native Villages were not tribes. According to the
Alaska courts, two prerequisites for a finding of tribal sovereignty are
residence on a reservation or a reserve, and a tribal rather than a vil-
77. Harring, supra note 69, at 292 (citing Kie, 27 F. at 354-58).
78. The Tlingit are a Native Alaskan society. See CASE, supra note 14, at 335.
79. Harring, supra note 69, at 290 (citing United States v. Kie, 26 F. Cas. 776 (D. Alaska
1885) (No. 15528a) (trial court)).
80. Ex parte Crow Dog, 109 U.S. 556, 561-62 (1883).
81. Harring, supra note 69, at 291-92 (citing Kie, 27 F. 351). Contra Tee-Hit-Ton Indians v.
United States, 348 U.S. 272, 278-80 (1955) (holding that Alaska Natives retained aboriginal title
after the Treaty of Cession).
82. Harring, supra note 69, at 291-92 (citing Kie, 27 F. at 354-58).
83. Metlakatla Indian Community v. Egan, 362 P.2d 901, 920 (Alaska 1961), rev'd in part,
369 U.S. 45 (1962) (reversed as to the Metlakatla Reserve because it was one of two statutorily
created reserves in Alaska); see also Harrison v. State, 791 P.2d 359 (Alaska Ct. App. 1990)
(affirming requirement of reservation). This court also indicated it was bound by the decisions of
the Alaska Supreme Court, despite conflicting federal appellate case law. Id. at 363 n.7.
84. Metlakatla, 362 P.2d at 920; see also Harrison, 791 P.2d at 362-64.
85. Native Village of Stevens v. Alaska Management & Planning, 757 P.2d 32, 37-41 (Alaska
1988).
86. Id. at 39-42.
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lage organization.87 Congress, however, created few reservations for
Native Villages.88 In addition, Native Villages had not executed trea-
ties or received tax exemptions like Native American tribes, and state,
rather than federal, criminal laws applied to Native Villages.89 Fur-
ther, the social organization of Native Villages indicated that Alaska
lacked ethnological tribes.90 Thus, the Alaska state courts denied sov-
ereign status to Native Villages.
3. Federal Cases and Native Village Sovereignty
The decisions of the federal courts in the twentieth century directly
conflict with the Alaska state court decisions on issues involving
Native Villages. Unlike the Alaska state courts, federal courts have
consistently held that Alaska Natives have the same legal status as
other Native Americans and are entitled to the same benefits and
protections.91
First, according to the federal courts, Native Villages are in the
same ward-guardian relationship to the federal government as other
Native American tribes. 92 The Treaty of Cession wilth Russia did not
extinguish Native title.93 Instead, the Treaty placed Native Villages
under the guardianship of the federal government, and thus they are
entitled to the benefits of the federal-tribal relationship.94
Second, the federal courts have concluded that Native Villages con-
stitute tribes. The federal government recognizes Native Villages as
tribes when the Secretary of the Interior approves a traditional council
governing board organized under the IRA." Further, because
ANCSA recognized Native Villages, they are entitled to the benefits of
87. Atkinson v. Haldane, 569 P.2d 151 (Alaska 1977) (conclading that Metlakatla
Community was more like Native American tribes than other Native Alaska Villages); see also
Ollestead v. Native Village of Tyonek, 560 P.2d 31 (Alaska) (concluding that reserve
extinguished by ANSCA is sufficient to confer tribal recognition), cer.'. denied, 434 U.S. 938
(1977).
88. Native Village of Stevens, 757 P.2d at 35; see also Metlakatla, 362 P.2d at 917-18, 920.
89. Metlakatla, 362 P.2d at 919-20.
90. Id at 917-20.
91. Alaska Chapter, Associated Gen. Contractors v. Pierce, 694 F.2d 1162, 1168 n.10 (9th
Cir. 1982). Notably, the word "Indians" has been consistently interpreted to mean both Native
Americans and Alaska Natives. See, eg., Pence v. Kleppe, 529 F.2d 135, 138 n.5 (9th Cir. 1976).
92. Alaska Chapter, 694 F.2d at 1169 n.10; see also, eg., Alaska Pac. Fisheries Co. v. United
States, 248 U.S. 78 (1918).
93. Tee-Hit-Ton Indians v. United States, 348 U.S. 272, 278-80 (1955) (concluding Native
title existed after Treaty of Cession).
94. Alaska Chapter, 694 F.2d at 1169 n.10.
95. Native Village of Noatak v. Hoffman, 872 F.2d 1384, 1387 (9th Cir. 1989), rev'd on other
grounds sub nom. Blatchford v. Native Village of Noatak, 111 S. Ct. 2578 (1991).
Recognizing Sovereignty in Alaska Native Villages
recognized tribes.9 6 Native Villages also meet the basic definition of a
tribe under Montoya v. United States;97 they are groups of Indians of
the same or similar race united in a community under a single govern-
ment in a particular territory.98 Additionally, while federal statutes
may confer limited recognition for the purposes of each statute, the
nature and scope of the government's relationship with the villages
indicates a more substantial recognition.99 Extensive legislation and
federal programs treat Native Villages like other Native American
tribes, and evidence a more expansive recognition of Native
Villages.100
Third, although Native Villages historically did not organize onto
reservations or into tribal units, and have never entered into treaties,
the federal courts have not found these differences fatal.10 1 Instead,
the courts have approved Congress' accommodation of Alaska
Natives' unique situation through the use of methods other than tribal
membership rolls or proximity to reservations to determine Alaska
Native eligibility for Indian programs.10 2 Congress allowed formation
of IRA-organized Native governments in Alaska to create federally
recognizable entities. 103 ANCSA's settlement of land claims also
accomodated the unique circumstances of Native Villages." ° Thus,
federal courts have construed these federal actions in favor of estab-
lishing Native rights.105
II. ALASKA NATIVE VILLAGES ARE SOVEREIGN UNDER
THE TRIBE-INDIAN COUNTRY TEST
The current federal policy toward Native Americans promotes self-
determination by encouraging Native Americans to govern themselves
socially and politically. Yet, the apparent disagreement between the
96. Id. at 1388.
97. 180 U.S. 261 (1901); see supra notes 25-26 and accompanying text.
98. Native Village of Noatak 872 F.2d at 1387.
99. See id. at 1388; see also Native Village of Tyonek v. Puckett, 953 F.2d 1179 (9th Cir.)
withdrawn, 957 F.2d 631 (9th Cir. 1992) (on remand from the Supreme Court for reconsideration
in light of decision in Oklahoma Tax Comm'n v. Citizen Band Potawatomi Indian Tribe of
Oklahoma, Ill S. Ct. 905 (1991)). Notably, in the withdrawn opinion, the Ninth Circuit
concluded that Alaska Natives are under the guardianship and superintendence of the federal
government.
100. See Native Village of Noatak, 872 F.2d at 1388.
101. Alaska Chapter, Associated Gen. Contractors v. Pierce, 694 F.2d 1162, 1169 n.10 (9th
Cir. 1982).
102. Id.; see, eg., Morton v. Ruiz, 415 U.S. 199, 212 (1974).
103. Alaska Chapter, 694 F.2d at 1169 n.10.
104. Id.
105. Id.
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federal courts and Alaska courts over the questions of tribal status and
Indian country has left Native Villages without defined powers or
political identity. In light of the federal policy of self-determination
and the government's fiduciary obligations toward. Alaska Natives,
courts should confirm Native Villages' sovereign powers. Confirming
Native Village sovereignty will also satisfy the federal government's
fiduciary obligations toward Native Villages by providing them the
means to govern themselves effectively. Sections A and B, respec-
tively, argue that Native Villages are tribes and that they occupy
Indian country. Finally, section C argues that under the Supremacy
Clause of the U.S. Constitution, state courts should follow federal
court interpretations of Indian status.
A. Native Villages Constitute Tribes
As the federal courts have concluded, Native Villages constitute
tribes under the first prong of the Tribe-Indian country test 0 6 for sev-
eral reasons. First, the federal government has recognized Native Vil-
lages as tribes. Second, Native Villages satisfy the Montoya definition
of a tribe. Native Villages are also the modern-day successors of his-
torical sovereign entities, a requirement of both of the above. Third,
the nature and scope of the federal-village relationship indicates that
Native Villages constitute tribes. Fourth, while Native Villages
received different treatment from the federal government than other
Native American tribes, this should not undermine -their tribal status.
Congress has recognized Native Villages as tribes generally under
ANCSA, and for limited purposes under other federal statutes.
ANCSA's compensation of Native Villages, rather than individual
Natives, effectively recognized Native Villages as socio-political
units. 107 Further, ANCSA recognized only traditional Native Vil-
lages, rather than modern, urban villages where the majority of resi-
dents were not Natives. 08 Thus, by recognizing only those villages
that remained primarily Native and traditional, Congress recognized
the modern-day successors of historical village entities.
The federal government has also recognized Native Villages as
tribes for other limited purposes. For example, the Secretary of the
Interior made Native Villages eligible for benefits of Indian programs
106. See supra notes 95-100 and accompanying text.
107. 43 U.S.C.A. § 1603 (West 1986 & Supp. 1991); see CoHEN, supra note 2, at 742.
108. 43 U.S.C.A. § 1610(b)(2), (3) (West 1986 & Supp. 1991); see Native Village of Noatak v.
Hoffman, 896 F.2d 1157, 1160 (9th Cir. 1990) (holding that Native Villages listed in ANCSA are
recognized tribes), rev'd on other grounds sub nor. Blatchford v. Nativ! Village of Noatak, 111
S. Ct. 2578 (1991).
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administered throughout the United States. 9 Congress has also
included Native Villages in all major Indian legislation since the exten-
sion of the IRA to Alaska in 1936.110 Repeated recognition of Native
Villages for limited purposes is a de facto recognition of Native Vil-
lages as tribes.
Even if the federal government did not recognize Native Villages,
they constitute tribes under the Montoya test.II1 The Montoya defini-
tion of a tribe requires that the community be ethnically and culturally
distinct, but does not dictate a tribal form. 2 Montoya recognized
that tribal organizations vary in form. 13 Formal tribal organizations
generally existed only among tribes in the eastern United States, the
plains and the prairies.' Native organizations were smaller and
more attenuated west of the Rockies, in the Great Basin, and the Arc-
tic.' 5 Further, many present-day tribes are actually confederations of
smaller Indian groups that the United States consolidated for the pur-
poses of treaty making. 16
Native Villages have a socio-political structure similar to many rec-
ognized Native American tribes, though primarily tribes in the west-
ern United States. Alaska Natives traditionally organized along
family and clan lines.11 7 They formed regional and local bands, or
loosely structured units, rather than formal kinship and descent
groups.1 8 These bands united in communities that occupied and
shared a common subsistence area or territory.1 9 Although nearly all
Native Villages have maintained traditional structures for self-govern-
ment, most villages adopted non-Native governing structures after
contact with Europeans.120 Most villages established village councils
for community decision making, dispute resolution, and dealing with
Europeans.12 1 Eventually, many Native Villages formed IRA govern-
109. See, eg., 51 Fed. Reg. 25115, 25118 (1986) (listing tribal entities which have a special
relationship with the United States entitling them to Indian programs).
110. See COHEN, supra note 2, at 769 n.264.
111. See supra notes 25-26 and accompanying text.
112. See Montoya v. United States, 180 U.S. 261 (1901).
113. Id at 262-63.
114. COHEN, supra note 2, at 229.
115. Id.
116. Id at 231 n.17.
117. 6 HANDBOOK OF NORTH AMERICAN INDIANS 26 (William C. Sturtevant gen. ed., 1981)
[hereinafter Sturtevant]. See generally CASE, supra note 14, at 333.
118. CASE, supra note 14, at 333; Sturtevant, supra note 117, at 26.
119. CASE, supra note 14, at 333; Sturtevant, supra note 117, at 26.
120. COHEN, supra note 2, at 750-51.
121. Id.
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ments and corporations.1 22 Native Villages' social and cultural units
thus satisfy the Montoya definition despite the lack of a strict tribal
form.
The nature and scope of the federal-village relationship also estab-
lish the tribal status of Native Villages. The federad government has
treated Native Villages as though they were tribes in various contexts,
creating a relationship sufficient to establish tribal status without an
explicit act of recognition. 123 The failure to legislate regarding Alaska
Natives during Alaska's infancy did not imply nonrecognition of
Native Villages' tribal status. During this time, the federal govern-
ment neglected Alaska entirely, not merely Alaska Natives.12 4 Once
the federal government recognized its fiduciary responsibility toward
Alaska Natives, however, Congress began to legislate for their benefit
and protection. 125 For example, the federal government established
reservations in Alaska for the benefit of certain Native Villages.1 26
Congress extended the IRA to Alaska in 1936, manifesting a congres-
sional intent to treat Native Villages like other Native American
tribes.127 Similarly, the inclusion of Native Villages in federal pro-
grams for Indians, and in Indian legislation generally, substantiates a
significant federal-Native Village relationship. 28 The breadth and
depth of this federal-Native Village relationship demonstrate that
Native Villages are tribes.
Although Native Villages and other Native American tribes share
the same relationship with the federal government, Native Villages
have received different treatment. This unique treatment, however,
should not defeat their claim of sovereign tribal status for several rea-
sons. First, this different treatment is an accomodation of Native Vil-
lages' unique social and geographic circumstances, rather than a non-
recognition of their tribal status.' 29 This accomodation ensures that
Native Villages receive the same benefits and protections from the fed-
eral government as other Native American tribes. 130 Denying these
protections merely because Native Villages possess a different social
122. Id
123. Native Village ofNoatak v. Hoffman, 872 F.2d 1384, 1387 (9th Cir. 1989), rev'd on other
grounds sub nom. Blatchford v. Native Village of Noatak, 111 S. Ct. 2578 (1991).
124. NASKE, supra note 5, at 1-11.
125. See supra notes 49-67 and accompanying text.
126. See supra note 47.
127. See supra notes 49-55 and accompanying text.
128. See supra note 100 and accompanying text.
129. See Morton v. Ruiz, 415 U.S. 199, 212 (1974).
130. See supra notes 6-20 and accompanying text.
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organization or lack reservations would be contrary to the federal gov-
ernment's fiduciary obligations and the canons of construction.13 1
Second, the absence of treaties with Alaska Natives does not affect
their tribal status. Formal treaty making between the federal govern-
ment and all Indian tribes ended in 1871, only four years after the
purchase of Alaska,132 thus precluding the creation of any treaties
with Alaska Natives. The decision to end treaty making reflected a
political struggle in Congress rather than an Indian policy,1 33 and
courts should not use that political compromise as an excuse to deny
Native Villages sovereignty. Moreover, Congress continued to legis-
late on behalf of Indians even after treaty making ceased. 3
Third, although Native Villages generally lack reservations, a reser-
vation or reserve is not a precondition to recognition as a tribe.1 35 Not
all recognized tribes have reservations; some tribes occupy allotments
or dependent Indian communities, without undermining their tribal
status. 136 Moreover, ANCSA revoked reserves in Alaska without
affecting Native Village sovereignty. 137 Further, reservations histori-
cally have represented congressional intentions other than tribal rec-
ognition. Reservations have been vehicles for assimilating Native
Americans into non-Native culture, and for removing Native Ameri-
cans from lands desired by an expanding non-Native population.1 38
Native Villages may have escaped the breadth of this policy because
Alaska had a limited non-Native population and a large land area.
Thus, despite their unique situation, Native Villages are tribes under
all of the above tests.
B. Native Villages Occupy Indian Country in Alaska
Native Villages also satisfy the second prong of the Tribe-Indian
country test 139 because they occupy Indian country. Following the
131. Alaska Chapter, Associated Gen. Contractors v. Pierce, 694 F.2d 1162, 1169 n.10 (9th
Cir. 1982); see supra notes 15-20 and accompanying text.
132. Appropriations Act of March 3, 1871, ch. 120, § 1, 16 Stat. 544, 566 (codified at 25
U.S.C.A. § 71 (West 1983)).
133. COHEN, supra note 2, at 107 (noting that only the Senate ratified treaties, and the House
of Representatives wanted some of the power wielded over Indian affairs).
134. Id.
135. Alaska Chapter, 694 F.2d at 1169 n.10; see also Atkinson v. Haldane, 569 P.2d 151
(Alaska 1977).
136. See supra notes 30-33 and accompanying text.
137. Alaska Native Claims Settlement Act Amendments of 1987, Pub. L. No. 100-241, § 2,
101 Stat. 1788, 1789 (1988) (Revocation of reserves did not "confer on, or deny... sovereign
governmental authority.").
138. See generally COHEN, supra note 2, at 121-27.
139. See supra notes 30-41 and accompanying text.
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passage of ANCSA, the majority of Indian lands in Alaska qualify as
dependent Indian communities because they meet the three criteria of
the dependent Indian community analysis."4  Native Villages are
tribes meeting the first prong of the Tribe-Indian country test, as
shown above."' Native Villages also occupy land validly set aside for
them, and they remain under the federal government's supervision
through programs, benefits, and legislation.
Native Villages satisfy the second criterion of the dependent Indian
community analysis 42 because they occupy land validly set aside for
them. First, Native Villages occupy land with unextinguished title. If
Alaska Natives were sovereign before the purchase of Alaska, they
could only lose their sovereignty by an express act of Congress or by
voluntarily assimilating into non-Native culture.143 Yet, neither the
Treaty of Cession nor the Alaska Organic Act of .884 extinguished
Native title or possession to the land Native Villages occupied.' 44
Second, Native Villages are the traditional occupants of their land,
which they have continued to occupy up to and after the passage of
ANCSA. That few reservations were created before ANCSA, and
subsequently were revoked by ANCSA, does not alter the fact of con-
tinued Native occupation. As with the determination of tribal status,
under federal law the existence of a reservation is not a prerequisite for
Indian country. 145  Nor does ownership in fee simple diminish the
tribe's sovereign status or the protection afforded the tribal land
base. 146
Third, the federal government's actions also demonstrate its belief
that Indian country, and thus land validly set aside, exists in Alaska.
As early as 1869, the federal government treated Alaska as Indian
country by applying the Indian Trade and Intercourse Act to regulate
the liquor and firearms trades. 47 The enactment of Public Law
280,148 which extended limited state jurisdiction over "all Indian
country in the Territory,"' 49 also demonstrates congressional recogni-
140. See supra notes 34-41 and accompanying text.
141. See supra notes 106-38 and accompanying text.
142. See supra notes 34-37 and accompanying text.
143. Native Village of Venetie I.R.A. Council v. Alaska, 944 F.2d 548, 558 (9th Cir. 1991).
144. See supra notes 68-82 and accompanying text.
145. 18 U.S.C.A. § 1151 (West 1984).
146. United States v. Chavez, 290 U.S. 357, 364 (1933); Indian Country, U.S.A., Inc. v.
Oklahoma, 829 F.2d 967 (10th Cir. 1987); see also 18 U.S.C.A. § 1151 (West 1984).
147. Harring, supra note 69, at 284 (Indian country included the lands actually occupied by
the Alaska Natives).
148. Act of Aug. 8, 1958, Pub. L. No. 85-615, 72 Stat. 545 (codifei at 18 U.S.C.A. § 1162
(West 1984)).
149. Id.; COHEN, supra note 2, at 765.
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tion of Indian country in Alaska as of 1958.150 Further, while
ANCSA disclaims any effect on the existence of Indian country in
Alaska,"' by recognizing Native claims to the land it effectively recog-
nized Indian country in Alaska.
Native Villages also satisfy the supervision criterion 152 of the depen-
dent Indian community analysis. First, Alaska Natives continue to
receive federal programs and benefits, even after the passage of
ANCSA. "3 These programs ensure that Native Villages receive basic
services of food, education, and health care." 4 While Alaska Natives
are currently entitled to these benefits, prosperity could render them
unnecessary, either in fact or politically. Without continued depen-
dence upon the federal government, Native Villages might no longer
fulfill the supervision criterion of the dependent Indian community
analysis. Encouraging Villages to become financially viable, however,
and then denying them sovereignty on that basis would be inconsistent
with the federal government's fiduciary obligations. Even if Congress
withdrew assistance programs from Alaska Natives, it would still
retain plenary power to enact protective legislation,1 5 and thus, the
government would retain supervision over Native Villages.
Second, Congress has retained supervision of Native Villages by
including Alaska Natives in all major Indian legislation since
ANCSA 1 56 Thus, Congress has recognized its continuing fiduciary
responsibility toward Alaska Natives and its power to legislate on
their behalf.15 7 So long as Native Villages remain dependent upon the
federal government for assistance and protection, the lands which they
occupy constitute Indian country.
As a final note to both the preceding sections, recognizing Native
Villages as tribes will also satisfy the federal government's fiduciary
obligation to promote and protect Native interests.15 8 Tribal recogni-
tion will provide Native Villages with the means of self-governance to
which they are entitled. The Treaty of Cession placed Alaska Natives
150. See COHEN, supra note 2, at 765.
151. Alaska Native Claims Settlement Act Amendments of 1987, Pub. L. No. 100-241, § 17,
101 Stat. 1788, 1814 (1988).
152. See supra notes 38-41 and accompanying text.
153. 43 U.S.C.A. § 1626 (West 1986 & Supp. 1991).
154. See COHEN, supra note 2, at 769-70.
155. See supra notes 14-16 and accompanying text; see also Menominee Tribe of Indians v.
United States, 391 U.S. 404 (1968) (holding that statutory termination of tribes did not terminate
government's fiduciary obligations).
156. See COHEN, supra note 2, at 769 n.264.
157. Alaska Chapter, Associated Gen. Contractors v. Pierce, 694 F.2d 1162, 1169 n.10 (9th
Cir. 1982) (holding that Alaska Natives have same ward status as other Native Americans).
158. See supra notes 15-20 and accompanying text.
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under the guardianship of the United States, subjecting them to the
same Indian laws applied to other Native Americans.'59 Therefore,
Alaska Natives stand in the same relation to the federal government as
other Native Americans, and are entitled to the benefit and protection
of that special relationship. Protecting Native interests requires courts
to construe federal actions and legislation in favor of establishing
Indian rights."6° Where, as here, Congress has not: explicitly denied
sovereign status to Native Villages, courts should find that Native Vil-
lages are sovereign.
C. Supremacy Clause Should Require Alaska State Courts to Follow
Federal Precedent
Under the Supremacy Clause of the U.S. Constitution,16 1 states
must observe federal laws and treaties.'62 As federal law historically
governs Indian affairs, the issue is within the unique qualifications of
the federal courts.1 63 Where federal courts have settled particular
questions of federal law, the Supremacy Clause should require state
courts to follow federal precedent. Indeed, the Supreme Court has
reached this result with respect to the interpretation of Indian trea-
ties."6 Thus, the conclusions of the federal courts regarding Native
Villages should carry greater weight than state court decisions. There-
fore, Alaska state courts should follow the federal courts' application
of the Tribe-Indian country test and conclude that Native Villages are
sovereign. A problem, however, remains. Because dependent Indian
communities are defined by Native occupation rather than by title,
their boundaries and hence their jurisdictional authority are
uncertain. 1 6
5
III. THE BOUNDS OF INDIAN COUNTRY IN ALASKA
Unlike reservations and allotments, the boundaries of dependent
Indian communities are not exact. Without well-delined jurisdictional
boundaries, Native Villages lack certainty and predictability when
exercising their governmental authority. This uncertainty inhibits
159. Alaska Pac. Fisheries Co. v. United States, 248 U.S. 78 (1918); Alaska v. Annette Island
Packing Co., 289 F. 671 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 263 U.S. 708 (1923).
160. See supra notes 18-20 and accompanying text.
161. U.S. CONST. art. VI, § 2.
162. COHEN, supra note 2, at 658.
163. See id. at 273.
164. See Washington v. Washington State Commercial Passenger Fishing Vessel Ass'n, 443
U.S. 658 (1979); United States v. Washington, 384 F. Supp. 312 (W.D. Wash. 1974), affid, 520
F.2d 676 (9th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1086 (1976).
165. See COHEN, supra note 2, at 38-39.
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their ability to adequately protect and promote their interests. Con-
gress, unfortunately, has not explicitly defined the jurisdictional
boundaries of Native Villages despite its fiduciary obligation to protect
and promote Native interests. Although ANCSA did not alter Native
Village sovereignty, it also did not define these boundaries. Native
Villages may organize into muncipal corporations and may exercise
governmental authority over the limited area within improved town-
ships.166 These municipal corporations, however, have no authority
over Village territory outside the townships. Yet, the lack of precise
boundaries should not diminish the sovereign powers of Native
Villages.
Congress expressly avoided the question of Native Village sover-
eignty when it settled aboriginal land claims in Alaska with
ANCSA. 16 7 Yet, the revocation of almost all reservations in Alaska
and the settlement of Native land claims raised the very issues which
Congress purported to avoid. Thus, ANCSA created an ambiguity
with respect to Indian country and Native sovereignty. The canons of
construction require courts to construe ambiguities in statutes in favor
of Indian rights. 68 Construction of ANCSA in favor of Native Vil-
lage rights permits defining the boundaries of Indian country in
Alaska as the territory conveyed to Native Village corporations under
the Act. This construction is permissible for several reasons. First,
promoting self-sufficiency is one of the purposes of ANCSA. Second,
the 1987 amendments to ANCSA clarify earlier ambiguities by recog-
nizing the importance of Native control over Village holdings.
Finally, the manner in which Native lands are held does not alter the
existence of Indian country.
Encouraging Native corporations to become profitable and self-suffi-
cient is one of the purposes of ANCSA. 16 9 Construing ANCSA as
defining jurisdictional boundaries promotes Native self-sufficiency by
permitting Village governmental control over Village territory. At
present, the duty of Native corporations to their corporate sharehold-
ers limits their actions. 170 A sovereign Village government, on the
other hand, may deal with its property in a governmental capacity,
and may regulate the right to use property, including imposing land
166. See supra note 63.
167. See supra note 137.
168. See supra notes 18-20 and accompanying text.
169. See Alaska Native Claims Settlement Act Amendments of 1987, Pub. L. No. 100-241,
§ 2, 101 Stat. 1788, 1788-89 (1988) (congressional findings and declaration of policy).
170. See COHEN, supra note 2, at 754-56.
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use and zoning controls."' Additionally, sovereign Villages may exer-
cise legislative powers delegated by Congress as would any other sov-
ereign government.172 Defining the boundaries of Village territory as
the land conveyed under ANCSA1 13 will provide Native Villages with
a certain and predictable boundary within which to exercise their gov-
ernmental authority and promote their self-sufficiency.
The 1987 amendments to ANCSA clarify the initial ambiguities
concerning congressional intent and recognize the importance of
Native control over their lands. Although ANCSA does not expressly
limit or abrogate Native sovereignty, on its face it resembles earlier
statutes that advocated termination and assimilation, such as the Gen-
eral Allotment Act."7 However, Congress did not intend ANCSA to
confer or deny a Native organization's sovereign powers.'75 In fact,
the 1987 amendments to ANCSA provide more Native control over
corporate holdings. 7 6 Viewed in the light most favorable to Native
Villages,'77 these amendments overcome any lingering argument that
ANCSA was intended to divest Native Villages of their sovereignty.178
The manner in which lands are held should not affect the exercise of
Native Village governmental powers.17 9 While ANCSA passed lands
to Village corporations,180 it did not alter the sovereignty of Native
governments." Village corporations function similarly to IRA cor-
porations that existed alongside sovereign tribal governments. 8 2 IRA
corporations conducted the tribe's business while -the tribal govern-
ment retained authority over the tribe's political affairs." 3 After
ANCSA, the Native corporation similarly exists alongside the IRA
171. Id. at 248-57. But cf Brendale v. Confederated Tribes and Bands of Yakima Indian
Nation, 492 U.S. 408 (1989) (distinguishing between power to zone on open and closed areas of
reservation).
172. United States v. Mazurie, 419 U.S. 544 (1975).
173. Native Village jurisdiction should also include any remaining reserves and allotments,
which are also Indian country under 18 U.S.C.A. § 1151 (West 1984).
174. Monroe E. Price, A Moment in History: The Alaska Native Claims Settlement Act, 8
UCLA-ALAsKA L. REv. 89 (1979). As the Allotment Act attempted to assimilate Native
Americans into mainstream society by turning them into farmers, ANCSA attempts to assimilate
Alaska Natives by turning them into corporate shareholders. Id at 9;.
175. See supra note 137.
176. Alaska Native Claims Settlement Act Amendments of 1987, Pub. L. No. 100-241, § 2,
101 Stat. 1788, 1788-89 (1988).
177. See supra notes 18-20 and accompanying text.
178. See supra note 137 and accompanying text.
179. See generally Native Village of Noatak v. Hoffman, 896 F.2d 1157, 1160 (9th Cir. 1990),
rev'd on other grounds sub nom. Blatchford v. Native Village of Noatak, 111 S. Ct. 2578 (1991).
180. See supra notes 62-67 and accompanying text.
181. See supra note 137.
182. See supra note 51 and accompanying text.
183. See supra note 51 and accompanying text.
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Village government, the traditional Village government, or the state-
law Native municipality. 184 The comparison is complicated because
Native corporations are organized under state law" 5 rather than
under the authorizing federal legislation like IRA corporations.1 6
However, in light of the settled principle that courts should liberally
construe ambiguities in favor of the Indians,1 8 1 state incorporation of
Native corporations should not diminish the sovereign authority of the
Village. Tribal sovereignty is not inconsistent with land ownership by
a corporate entity.
The possibility of non-Native ownership or control of Native lands
also should not alter this conclusion. Although ANCSA restricts
alienation of stock and permits only Natives to hold voting stock in
Native corporations, non-Natives may still own substantial non-voting
stock.188 Non-Natives, however, own lands on Indian reservations
throughout the United States, yet the tribal government still retains
jurisdiction over these lands.1 89 Moreover, states, counties, and other
governmental units also maintain jurisdiction over lands held by indi-
vidual and corporate entities. As a sovereign governmental entity,
Native Villages should similarly control the lands within their terri-
tory regardless of who or what owns the title. Recognizing the sover-
eign jurisdiction of Native Villages will enable them to pursue
economic self-sufficiency without sacrificing their cultural identity.
IV. CONCLUSION
Despite the conclusions of the Alaska state courts, Alaska Native
Villages are sovereign tribes with the power to exercise governmental
authority over their tribal territory. As sovereign entities, Native Vil-
lages would have the means to govern themselves effectively and with
dignity. Confirming Native Village sovereignty is also consistent with
the federal government's fiduciary obligations toward Alaska Natives.
Defining Village jurisdiction as the land conveyed under ANCSA
gives the Village a concrete territory over which to exercise authority,
184. See supra notes 65-67 and accompanying text.
185. 43 U.S.C.A. §§ 1606(d), 1607(a) (West 1986 & Supp. 1991).
186. 25 U.S.C.A. §§ 476-477 (West 1983 & Supp. 1991).
187. Three Affiliated Tribes v. Wold Eng'g, P.C., 467 U.S. 138, 149 (1984); see supra notes
18-20 and accompanying text.
188. See supra note 64. Additionally, non-Native stockholders could force a merger or buy-
out of a Native corporation, thus divesting the corporation of Native control. Further, since
corporations have a duty to act for the benefit of their shareholders, a significant non-Native
ownership could result in actions taken that are adverse to Native interests but in the best
interests of the corporation.
189. See COHEN, supra note 2, at 252-57.
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and provides the Village with a political base to protect its interests.
The current reliance on village and regional corporations does not suf-
ficiently protect Native Village interests. By settling the issue of juris-
dictional boundaries, Native Villages will have greater power to
establish viable economies within their traditional social framework.
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